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RING AROUND THE JURY: REVIEWING 
FLORIDA’S CAPITAL SENTENCING 
FRAMEWORK IN HURST V. FLORIDA 
RICHARD GUYER* 
INTRODUCTION 
In Ring v. Arizona, the Supreme Court struck down an Arizona capital 
sentencing statute that allowed a sentencing judge, sitting without a jury, to 
find an aggravating factor necessary for imposition of the death penalty.1 
The Court held that the jury needed to have found an aggravating factor to 
render the defendant eligible for the death penalty.2 In Florida, the jury 
plays only an advisory role in the penalty phase. The trial judge is tasked 
with making independent findings as to the presence of aggravating factors, 
mitigating factors, and the balance between the two.3 Ultimately, the trial 
judge decides whether to sentence a defendant to death or life in prison.4 
In Hurst v. Florida,5 the Court will review Florida’s death sentencing 
scheme to determine whether it violates the Sixth6 or Eighth Amendments.7 
Part I of this Commentary describes the factual background of the case. 
Part II explains the legal background and the evolution of Sixth and Eighth 
Amendment jurisprudence. Part III explains the Florida Supreme Court’s 
holding in Hurst v. Florida, which affirmed Timothy Hurst’s death 
sentence. Part IV outlines the arguments put forth by both parties. Part V 
argues that the Supreme Court should accept Petitioner’s arguments and 
hold Florida’s capital sentencing framework unconstitutional. 
Florida’s capital sentencing framework violates the Sixth Amendment 
* J.D. Candidate, Duke University School of Law, Class of 2017.
1. Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002).
2. Id.
3. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.141(2)–(3) (West 2010).
4. Id.
5. 135 S. Ct. 1531 (2015).
6. U.S. CONST. amend. VI (“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to
a . . . trial, by an impartial jury . . . .”). 
7. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII (“Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed,
nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted”). 
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as interpreted in Ring because (1) the trial judge makes the ultimate 
decision of whether to find aggravating factors necessary to sentence a 
defendant to death and, consequently, (2) the trial judge may override the 
jury’s advisory sentencing recommendation. The Florida statute also 
violates the Eighth Amendment because death, due to its finality, is a 
fundamentally unique punishment in our legal system. A jury, rather than a 
judge, better reflects society’s moral views, which are critical to weigh 
when deciding whether to impose the death penalty. 
I.  FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
On the morning of May 2, 1998, the body of Cynthia Lee Harrison, an 
employee at a Popeye’s Fried Chicken restaurant in Escambia County, 
Florida, was found in the restaurant’s freezer.8 Her hands were bound with 
electrical tape, her mouth was taped shut, and her body was covered with 
“a minimum of sixty incised slash and stab wounds” that matched the use 
of a box cutter.9 
Petitioner Timothy Lee Hurst, Harrison’s co-worker, was charged and 
convicted of first-degree murder.10 Despite testimony during the penalty 
phase that Hurst was emotionally and mentally impaired, the jury 
recommended the death penalty.11 The trial court then sentenced Hurst to 
death on its independent finding that the statutory aggravating factors of the 
case outweighed any mitigating factors.12 The Florida Supreme Court 
affirmed the death sentence,13 and the U.S. Supreme Court denied Hurst’s 
petition for a writ of certiorari.14 
 
However, in 2009 the Florida Supreme Court vacated Hurst’s death 
sentence on post-conviction review.15 The court held his attorney’s failure 
to investigate or present evidence about Hurst’s deficient mental condition 
	  
 8.  Joint Appendix, Vol. 1, at 28–29, Hurst v. Florida, 135 S. Ct. 1531 (2015) (No. 14-7505), 
2015 WL 5562982, at *28–29 [hereinafter Joint Appendix]. 
 9.  Id. at 29. 
 10.  Id. at 32. 
 11.  Hurst v. State, 819 So. 2d 689, 694 (Fla. 2002). 
 12.  Id. The trial court found three aggravating circumstances: (1) the murder was committed by a 
person engaged in the commission of a robbery (“great weight”); (2) the murder was especially heinous, 
atrocious, and cruel (“great weight”); and (3) the murder was committed for the purpose of avoiding or 
preventing a lawful arrest (“great weight”). The State never argued the avoiding arrest aggravating 
circumstance, and the jury never received instruction on it. 
 13.  See Hurst v. State, 819 So. 2d 689, 692 (Fla. 2002). 
 14.  See Hurst v. Florida, 537 U.S. 977 (2002). 
 15.  Joint Appendix, supra note 8, at 127. 
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during the initial trial “had an identifiable detrimental effect on the process 
of weighing the aggravation and mitigation in this case.”16 Due to this 
failure, the court vacated the death sentence and ordered that Hurst be 
resentenced.17 
On remand to the trial court, the State and defense counsel presented 
evidence of aggravating and mitigating circumstances to the jury.18 At the 
close of this penalty phase, the court instructed the jury that “the final 
decision as to which punishment shall be imposed is the responsibility of 
the judg . . . [and] the law requires you to render an advisory sentence as to 
which punishment shall be imposed.”19 After this instruction, the jury voted 
7-5 to recommend the death sentence.20 The verdict did not specify which 
aggravating factors the jury had found, and Hurst’s motion for an 
interrogatory verdict was denied.21 The trial court then “independently 
weigh[ed] the aggravating and mitigating circumstances,”22 and sentenced 
Hurst to death.23 
On appeal to the Florida Supreme Court, Hurst urged the court to 
invalidate Florida’s capital sentencing scheme under Ring v. Arizona.24 The 
court ruled against him, citing Supreme Court precedent that had 
previously upheld Florida’s capital sentencing scheme.25 Hurst successfully 
petitioned for a writ of certiorari from the Supreme Court.26 
 
On January 12, 2016, the U.S. Supreme Court held Florida’s capital 
sentencing scheme violated the Sixth Amendment in an 8-1 decision.27 
	  
 16.  Id. at 190. In addition to brain abnormalities consistent with fetal alcohol syndrome, Hurst’s 
mental deficiencies were reflected in “an IQ of somewhere between 70 and 78” and “below average 
adaptive functioning skills.” Id. at 179–87. 
 17.  Id. at 191. 
 18.  Id. at 296. 
 19.  Id. at 207. 
 20.  Id. at 24–25. 
 21.  Id. at 307. 
 22.  Id. at 259. 
 23.  Id. at 271. 
 24.  Id. at 307. 
 25.  See Hurst v. State, 147 So. 3d 435, 437 (Fla. 2014). Cf. Hildwin v. Florida, 490 U.S. 638, 
640–41 (1989) (“The Sixth Amendment does not require that the specific findings authorizing the 
imposition of the sentence of death be made by the jury.”), overruled by Hurst v. Florida, 136 S. Ct. 616 
(2016). 
 26.  See Hurst v. Florida, 135 S. Ct. 1531 (2015) (granting certiorari). 
 27.  Hurst v. Florida, 136 S. Ct. 616 (2016). 
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II.  LEGAL BACKGROUND  
A.  Florida’s Capital Sentencing Framework 
In Florida, the death penalty is administered only “if the proceeding 
held to determine sentencing . . . results in findings by the court that such 
person shall be punished to death.”28 
Following the conviction phase, “a separate sentencing proceeding . . . 
shall be conducted by the [same] trial judge before the [same] trial jury.”29 
In that sentencing proceeding, “the jury shall deliberate and render an 
advisory sentence to the court.”30 The jury must base its recommendation 
on “[w]hether sufficient aggravating circumstances exist”31 and “whether 
sufficient mitigating circumstances exist to outweigh the aggravating 
circumstances.”32 For a death sentence, only “a majority vote is 
necessary,”33 but “[n]othing in [Florida law] . . . requires a majority of the 
jury to agree on which aggravating circumstances exist.”34 Additionally, a 
trial court cannot require “a special verdict form that details the jurors’ 
votes on specific aggravating circumstances.”35 
However, “[n]otwithstanding the recommendation of a majority of the 
jury, the court, after weighing the aggravating and mitigating 
circumstances, shall enter a sentence of life imprisonment or death.”36 If 
the court chooses death, “it shall set forth in writing its findings upon 
which the sentence of death is based,” including aggravating and mitigating 
circumstances.37 The court “is not bound by the jury’s recommendation,”38 
but must accord the jury’s recommendation “great weight and serious 
consideration.”39 Further, “the trial court is required to make independent 
	  
 28.  FLA. STAT. ANN. § 775.082(1) (West 2014). 
 29.  FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.141(1) (West 2010). 
 30.  Id. § 921.141(2). 
 31.  Id. § 921.141(2)(a); see also id. § 921.141(5) (enumerating statutory aggravating 
circumstances). 
 32.  Id. § 921.141(2)(b); see also id. § 921.141(6) (enumerating statutory mitigating 
circumstances). 
 33.  Ault v. State, 53 So. 3d 175, 205 (Fla. 2010). 
 34.  State v. Steele, 921 So. 2d 538, 544 (Fla. 2006) (emphasis in original). 
 35.  Id. at 548. 
 36.  FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.141(3); see also Sam Kamin & Justin Marceau, The Facts About Ring 
v. Arizona and the Jury’s Role in Capital Sentencing, 13 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 529, 553 (2011) (“In 
other words, regardless of the decisions of the jury regarding the presence of aggravating factors and the 
extent to which they outweigh the case in mitigation, the trial judge is to re-balance these factors and 
determine anew whether death or life is merited.”). 
 37.  FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.141(3). 
 38.  Williams v. State, 967 So. 2d 735, 751 (Fla. 1983). 
 39.  Ross v. State, 386 So. 2d 1191, 1197 (Fla. 1980). 
GUYER	  FINAL	  READ_PK.DOCX	  (DO	  NOT	  DELETE)	   5/11/16	  	  3:56	  PM	  
246 DUKE JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW & PUBLIC POLICY SIDEBAR [VOL. 11 
findings on aggravation, mitigation, and weight.”40 If the trial court decides 
that death is the appropriate sentence, the Florida Supreme Court 
automatically reviews that decision.41 At that stage, it is the trial court’s 
“written findings of fact and the trial record which furnish the basis for [the 
Florida Supreme] Court’s review of the death sentence.”42 
B.  Capital Sentencing and the Sixth Amendment: Ring v. Arizona 
1.  Capital Sentencing in Arizona Before Ring 
Prior to Ring, when a Arizona jury convicted someone of first-degree 
murder, the trial judge alone was tasked with finding the aggravating factor 
or factors necessary to impose the death penalty. The jury was excluded 
from making any findings at the sentencing stage.43 Specifically, the 
Arizona statute required the trial judge to “conduct a separate sentencing 
hearing to determine the existence or nonexistence of [certain enumerated] 
circumstances . . . for the purpose of determining the sentence to be 
imposed.”44 An individual could not be given a death sentence “unless at 
least one aggravating factor [was] found to exist beyond a reasonable 
doubt” by the trial judge.45 Finally, the statute mandated that “[t]he court 
alone shall make all factual determinations” when determining if an 
aggravating factor is present.46 
In Walton v. Arizona,47 the Supreme Court upheld the Arizona scheme 
as consistent with the Sixth Amendment “because the additional facts 
found by the judge qualified as sentencing considerations, not as 
‘element[s] of the offense of capital murder.’”48 Just ten years after Walton, 
however, the Supreme Court decided in Apprendi v. New Jersey that the 
Sixth Amendment protects a defendant from being “expose[d] . . . to a 
penalty exceeding the maximum he would receive if punished according to 
the facts reflected in the jury verdict alone.”49 Overruling Walton, the 
Apprendi Court held, “[i]f a State makes an increase in a defendant’s 
	  
 40.  Russ v. State, 73 So. 3d 178, 198 (Fla. 2011). 
 41.  FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.141(4). 
 42.  Grossman v. State, 525 So. 2d 833, 839 (Fla. 1988), receded from on other grounds in 
Franqui v. State, 699 So. 2d 1312 (Fla. 1997). 
 43.  Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 588 (2002). 
 44.  ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-703(c) (West 2001), invalidated by Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 
584, 588 (2002). 
 45.  Id. 
 46.  Id. 
 47.  497 U.S. 639 (1990). 
 48.  Ring, 536 U.S. at 588 (quoting Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 649 (1990)). 
 49.  Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 483 (2000). 
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authorized punishment contingent on the finding of a fact, that fact—no 
matter how the State labels it—must be found by a jury beyond a 
reasonable doubt.”50 Importantly, the Court noted “the relevant inquiry is 
one not of form, but of effect.”51 
2.  Ring v. Arizona: Arizona’s Capital Sentencing Scheme Struck Down 
In 1996, Timothy Ring was convicted of first-degree murder in the 
killing of a Wells Fargo armored van driver.52 Ring’s maximum potential 
sentence—life imprisonment—could not be increased to the death penalty 
without additional findings of fact.53 The judge then found two aggravating 
factors and one mitigating factor, but decided that the mitigating factor did 
not “call for leniency.”54 The judge sentenced Ring to death.55 
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine “whether that 
aggravating factor may be found by the judge . . . or whether the Sixth 
Amendment’s jury trial guarantee . . . requires that the aggravating factor 
determination be entrusted to the jury.”56 Ring recognized that  Apprendi 
was “irreconcilable” with Walton.57 The Court acknowledged the 
importance of stare decisis, but noted it has “overruled prior decisions 
where the necessity and propriety has been established.”58 Ring overruled 
Walton because it took the jury’s constitutionally mandated fact-finding 
role and placed it entirely in the judge’s purview.59 Therefore, in capital 
sentencing schemes where aggravating factors “operate as the functional 
equivalent of an element of a greater offense, the Sixth Amendment 
requires that they be found by a jury.”60 
C.  Capital Sentencing and the Eighth Amendment: “Death is Different” 
The Supreme Court “almost always treats death cases as a class 
apart.”61 The Court has consistently held that a state must “minimize the 
risk of wholly arbitrary and capricious action in imposing the death 
	  
 50.  Ring, 536 U.S. at 585–86 (citing Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 482–83). 
 51.  Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 494. 
 52.  See Ring, 536 U.S. at 591 (“The jury . . . convicted Ring of felony murder occurring in the 
course of armed robbery.”). 
 53.  Id. 
 54.  Id. at 594–95. 
 55.  Id. at 595. 
 56.  Id. at 597 (footnotes omitted). 
 57.  Id. at 589, 609. 
 58.  Id. at 608 (quoting Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 172 (1989)). 
 59.  Id. at 609 (citing Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 647–49 (1990)). 
 60.  Id. (quoting Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 494 n.19 (2000)). 
 61.  Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 286–87 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring). 
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penalty” by adding procedural safeguards to its capital sentencing 
framework.62 Historically, three justifications—deterrence, incapacitation, 
and retribution—have supported the imposition of the death penalty.63 
Additionally, the sentence imposed must be reasonable with respect to the 
defendant’s background and character, and the crime committed.64 
III.  HOLDING 
The Florida Supreme Court affirmed Hurst’s death sentence, citing U.S.  
Supreme Court precedent upholding Florida’s capital sentencing 
framework.65 The court distinguished Florida’s sentencing procedures from 
those in Ring v. Arizona because “Florida’s sentencing procedures do 
provide for jury input[,] . . . a process that was completely lacking in the 
Arizona statute struck down in Ring.”66 The dissent noted that “the jury 
recommended death by the slimmest margin permitted under Florida 
law . . . seven-to-five . . . [making it] actually possible that there was not 
even a majority of jurors who agreed that the same aggravator applied,” 
thereby violating Ring.67 
The U.S. Supreme Court overruled the Florida Supreme Court, holding 
Florida’s capital sentencing scheme unconstitutional for violating the Sixth 
Amendment.68 The Court determined that the trial judge, not the jury, had 
found the facts necessary to authorize Hurst’s death sentence, thus violating 
Ring’s clear requirement.69 The Court rejected Florida’s arguments, ruling 
that a jury’s advisory recommendation is insufficient to support imposing 
the death sentence.70 
	  
 62.  Brief of Amici Curiae Former Florida Circuit Court Judges in Support of Petitioner at 7, 
Hurst v. Florida, 135 S. Ct. 1531 (2015) (No. 14-7505), 2015 WL 3623138, at *7 (quoting Gregg v. 
Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 188–89 (1976)). 
 63.  See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 183–84, 183 n.28 (1976) (explaining the reasoning 
behind each of the justifications). 
 64.  Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 319 (1989) (quoting California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538, 545 
(1987) (O’Connor, J., concurring)). 
 65.  Hurst v. State, 147 So. 3d 435, 446 (Fla. 2014). The Florida Supreme Court based its decision 
on Hildwin v. Florida, which held that “the Sixth Amendment does not require that the specific findings 
authorizing the imposition of the sentence of death be made by the jury.” Hildwin v. Florida, 490 U.S. 
638, 640–41 (1989), overruled by Hurst v. Florida, 136 S. Ct. 616 (2016). 
 66.  Hurst, 147 So. 3d at 447. 
 67.  Id. at 449 (Pariente, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 68.  Hurst v. Florida, 136 S. Ct. 616 (2016). 
 69.  Id. at 622. 
 70.  Id. 
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IV.  ARGUMENTS 
A.  Hurst’s Arguments 
Hurst argued that Florida’s capital sentencing scheme violates the Sixth 
and Eighth Amendments. In formulating his Sixth Amendment challenge, 
Hurst singled out the jury’s “advisory role” as being especially problematic 
in light of Ring v. Arizona.71 Hurst proceeded to argue that, in Florida, the 
trial judge’s independent finding of statutory aggravating factors 
impermissibly abrogates the jury’s essential function as the fact-finder.72 
Hurst contended that Arizona’s and Florida’s capital sentencing statutes are 
not materially different, and because Ring invalidated Arizona’s statute, it 
should also invalidate Florida’s.73 
Tracing the history of the Sixth Amendment, Hurst argued that the jury 
has always played an essential fact-finding role in capital sentencing 
cases.74 Further, Hurst argued that, although stare decisis is normally 
adhered to, it “is at its nadir in cases concerning procedural rules that 
implicate fundamental constitutional protections.”75 Therefore, the Court 
should overturn its decision in Hildwin v. Florida and strike down Florida’s 
capital sentencing scheme.76 
Second, Hurst argued that Florida’s capital sentencing scheme “assigns 
to the judge the power to impose the death penalty,” thereby violating the 
Eighth Amendment.77 Hurst looked to the Court’s “three guideposts of . . . 
Eighth Amendment jurisprudence—history, current practice, and 
independent judgment”—to conclude that “juries, not judges, must be 
responsible for imposing the death penalty.”78 Hurst borrowed the 
reasoning from Justice Breyer’s concurring opinion in Ring, in which he 
asserted that retribution is the only constitutionally permissible basis for the 
death penalty, and that jurors are superior to judges in making that 
determination.79 
	  
 71.  See Brief for Petitioner at 14, Hurst v. Florida, 135 S. Ct. 1531 (2015) (No. 14-7505), 2015 
WL 3523406, at *14 (“[T]he jury makes no express findings as to aggravating factors, and its 
recommendation of death is neither necessary nor sufficient for imposition of the death sentence.”). 
 72.  See id. at 22 (arguing that “jury input” does not satisfy Ring or the Sixth Amendment). 
 73.  Id. at 23. 
 74.  See id. at 24 (discussing the jury’s “traditional” role as the fact-finder at the time of the 
ratification of the Sixth Amendment). 
 75.  See id. at 24–25 (quoting Alleyne v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2151, 2163 n.5 (2013)). 
 76.  Id. at 25–26. 
 77.  Id. at 26. 
 78.  Id. 
 79.  See id. at 30 (citing Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 614–15 (2002) (Breyer, J., concurring) 
(“Of the principal functions of criminal sentencing . . . only retribution provides a constitutionally 
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Finally, the American Bar Association,80 Former Justices of the 
Supreme Court of Florida,81 Former Florida Circuit Court Judges,82 and the 
American Civil Liberties Union83 filed amicus curiae briefs in support of 
Hurst arguing for a robust role of juries in capital sentencing. 
B.  Florida’s Arguments 
Florida argued that its capital sentencing scheme is fully compliant 
with the requirements of Ring, which are “narrow and specific.”84 Because 
Florida’s framework “still provides for a jury determination of whether 
there is at least one aggravating circumstance,”85 the jury’s finding of at 
least one aggravating circumstance would make the defendant eligible for 
the death penalty.86 At that point, the judge’s findings cannot enhance the 
maximum penalty available.87 Instead, Florida argued, the judge’s fact-
finding ability would afford the defendant greater protection.88 To counter 
Hurst’s assertion that a judge may impose the death penalty even when the 
jury recommends life, Florida underlined the rarity of such an occurrence, 
pointing out that the last time a judge overrode a jury’s life 
recommendation was in 1999.89 Moreover, the Court has consistently 
	  
defensible basis for application of the death penalty . . . [and] jurors possess an important comparative 
advantage over judges.”)). 
 80.  Brief of Amicus Curiae American Bar Association in Support of Petitioner, Hurst v. Florida, 
135 S. Ct. 1531 (2015) (No. 14-7505), 2015 WL 3623139 (arguing that a unanimous vote is required 
when a capital sentencing jury finds and weigh aggravating factors, or recommends that a death 
sentence should be imposed). 
 81.  Brief of Amici Curiae Former Justices of the Supreme Court of Florida in Support of 
Petitioner, Hurst, 135 S. Ct. 1531 (No. 14-7505), 2015 WL 3623137 (arguing that Florida jury 
recommendations are “devoid” of factual findings and are “essentially meaningless” for the sentencing 
judge) [hereinafter Brief of Amicus Curiae Former Justices of the Supreme Court of Florida]. 
 82.  Brief of Amici Curiae Former Florida Circuit Court Judges in Support of Petitioner, Hurst, 
135 S. Ct. 1531 (No. 14-7505), 2015 WL 3623138 (arguing Florida’s capital sentencing framework 
violates the Eighth Amendment because the death penalty has unique features that only a jury is capable 
of weighing). 
 83.  Brief Amici Curiae of the American Civil Liberties Union, the ACLU of Florida, and the 
Constitutional Accountability Center, in Support of Petitioner, Hurst, 135 S. Ct. 1531 (No. 14-7505), 
2015 WL 3608900 (arguing that a unanimous jury verdict is required by Sixth and Eighth Amendment 
jurisprudence). 
 84.  Brief for Respondent at 12, Hurst, 135 S. Ct. 1531(No. 14-7505), 2015 WL 4607695, at *12 
[hereinafter Brief for Respondent]. 
 85.  Id. 
 86.  Id. at 13. 
 87.  Id. 
 88.  Id. See also Brief of Amici Curiae Alabama and Montana in Support of Respondent, Hurst v. 
Florida, 135 S. Ct. 1531 (2015), 2015 WL 4747983 (arguing that Supreme Court precedent, history, and 
policy considerations such as the judge’s “less arbitrary and more consistent” sentencing support 
Florida’s capital sentencing framework). 
 89.  Id. at 6. 
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upheld Florida’s capital sentencing scheme in precedents such as Hildwin, 
characterizing the scheme as placing judge and jury on equal grounds as 
“cosentencer[s].”90 
V.  ANALYSIS 
The Court should accept Hurst’s arguments and hold that Florida’s 
capital sentencing framework violates the Sixth Amendment based on its 
previous holding in Ring v. Arizona. The Court should also hold that 
Florida’s scheme violates the Eighth Amendment, but that argument hinges 
on less substantial authority. The scheme violates the Sixth Amendment 
because (1) the trial judge makes the ultimate decision in finding the 
aggravating factors necessary to sentence a defendant to death and, 
consequently, (2) the trial judge may override the jury’s advisory 
sentencing recommendation. Florida’s statute also raises serious Eighth 
Amendment concerns because the imposition of death requires a wholly 
different analysis due to its unique finality. Only a jury can reflect society’s 
views on the moral decisions that death sentences inevitably involve. 
A.  Florida’s Capital Sentencing Scheme Violates the Sixth Amendment 
Ring held that any fact that increases the penalty at sentencing beyond 
the statutory maximum must be found by the jury.91 Accordingly, Ring 
requires a Florida jury to find at least one aggravating factor beyond a 
reasonable doubt before a defendant can be sentenced to death. Otherwise, 
the maximum punishment a defendant could receive is life imprisonment. 
However, a Florida jury serves only an advisory role in sentencing.92 
The question of whether there were any aggravating circumstances is 
presented to the jury, but no express finding is ever made.93 Although the 
trial judge is required to assign “great weight” to the jury’s 
determinations,94 the judge cannot possibly know the specifics of the jury’s 
findings and makes her own findings.95 As Florida case law notes, “the trial 
court is required to make independent findings on aggravation, mitigation, 
and weight.”96 The jury’s recommendation therefore has no identifiable 
binding effect at the sentencing stage. 
	  
 90.  Id. at 13. 
 91.  Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 609 (2002). 
 92.  See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.141(2) (West 2010). 
 93.  See id. (describing determinations of the jury in sentencing as merely “advisory”). 
 94.  Ross v. State, 386 So. 2d 1191, 1197 (Fla. 1980). 
 95.  See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.141(3) (West 2010). 
 96.  Russ v. State, 73 So. 3d 178, 198 (Fla. 2011). 
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Abrogating the jury’s role as the fact-finder violates the Sixth 
Amendment as it was interpreted in Ring. One may imagine a situation in 
which the jury first finds no aggravating circumstances, thereby 
recommending a life sentence, only to be followed by the trial judge 
finding an aggravating circumstance and imposing the death penalty, 
despite the jury’s recommendation. As Ring noted, the question is “who 
decides, judge or jury.”97 Clearly, in Florida the judge is the one who 
decides. 
This abrogation is further evidenced by the trial judge’s power to hear 
evidence on aggravating and mitigating circumstances not initially 
presented to the jury.98 This Spencer v. State hearing further reduces the 
jury’s role in the fact-finding process, rendering the jury recommendation 
“essentially meaningless.”99 Accordingly, the judge may impose a death 
sentence based on evidence of an aggravating circumstance that was never 
presented to the jury.100 Furthermore, because the jury is not required to 
make specific findings as to each element, the judge does not even receive 
an effective recommendation from the jury—she has no idea what 
aggravating circumstance the jury potentially found, only that the jury 
found something.101 The judge could disagree with the jury, find a different 
aggravating circumstance, and still impose the death penalty. More 
disconcerting is the fact that even if the jury recommends life, the judge 
can separately find a new aggravating circumstance and impose the death 
penalty anyways. 
This lack of specificity presents further difficulties for Florida’s capital 
sentencing framework in light of Ring. As the dissent in the Florida 
Supreme Court decision stated, “[It is] actually possible that there was not 
even a majority of jurors who agreed that the same aggravator applied.”102 
For example, in the event of a 7-5 jury vote recommending death, it is 
possible that there were three votes for Aggravator A, four votes for 
Aggravator B, and five votes for no aggravators. In that scenario, nine 
jurors voted that Aggravator A did not apply, and eight voted that 
Aggravator B did not apply. Therefore, it may not be true that “Hurst 
	  
 97.  Ring, 536 U.S. at 587 (citing Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 465, 492 (2000)). 
 98.  See Spencer v. State, 615 So. 2d 688, 691 (Fla. 1993) (specifying that the trial judge must 
“afford, if appropriate, both the State and the defendant an opportunity to present additional evidence”). 
 99.  Brief of Amici Curiae Former Justices of the Supreme Court of Florida, supra note 81, at 8. 
 100.  Id. at 3. 
 101.  See Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 648 (1990) (“A Florida trial court no more has the 
assistance of a jury’s findings of fact with respect to sentencing issues than [did] a trial judge in 
Arizona . . . .”). 
 102.  Hurst v. State, 147 So. 3d 435, 449 (Pariente, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
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received a death sentence only after the jury found beyond a reasonable 
doubt at least one aggravating circumstance.”103 
Finally, stare decisis should not control here. Although the Court has 
previously upheld Florida’s capital sentencing scheme in Hildwin v. 
Florida, the Court has “overruled prior decisions where the necessity and 
propriety of doing so has been established.”104 In Florida, capital 
defendants’ Sixth Amendment rights are violated. In this system, Florida 
judges are permitted to occupy a position that is meant for twelve citizens. 
Further, Hildwin was decided before the Court affirmed the right to jury 
fact-finding in Ring. 
B.  Florida’s Capital Sentencing Scheme Violates the Eighth Amendment 
The Court should also strike down Florida’s capital sentencing scheme 
as violating the Eighth Amendment. As Justice Breyer stated in his 
concurring opinion in Ring, “retribution provides the main justification in 
capital punishment, and . . . [the jury has a] comparative advantage in 
determining, in a particular case, whether capital punishment will serve that 
end.”105 In retributive decisions, jurors are superior because they “reflect 
more accurately the composition and experiences of the community as a 
whole.”106 Moreover, only the jury can “express the conscience of the 
community.”107 
Despite this comparative advantage, the judge is the true decision 
maker in Florida. Because death’s permanence makes it fundamentally 
different from every other form of punishment, morals are heavily involved 
in death penalty cases. And because the judge usurps the jury’s rightful role 
as the fact-finder in capital cases, defendants in Florida are robbed of their 
ability to appeal to the moral inclinations of the members of their 
communities. Those moral inclinations may go directly to the heart of 
whether something should truly be considered an aggravating or mitigating 
factor. 
However, it is unlikely that the Court will hold this scheme violates the 
Eighth Amendment. The Ring majority never decided whether Arizona’s 
	  
 103.  Brief for Respondent, supra note 84, at 14. 
 104.  Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 608 (2002) (quoting Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 
U.S. 164, 172 (1989)). 
 105.  Id. at 614 (2002) (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment). 
 106.  Id. at 615 (quoting Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 486 (1984) (Stevens, J., concurring in 
part and dissenting in part)). 
 107.  Brief for Petitioner, supra note 71, at 30 (quoting Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 519 
(1968)). 
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scheme violated the Eighth Amendment. Only Justice Breyer’s concurrence 
argued that the scheme violated the Eighth Amendment. As no other 
justices joined him in that opinion, the chances of others joining him this 
time are probably low. 
C.  Analysis of the Supreme Court’s Recent Ruling 
The U.S. Supreme Court ruled that the Florida capital sentencing 
scheme violated the Sixth Amendment because it based Hurst’s death 
sentence on a judge’s fact-finding, not a jury’s verdict.108 Using reasoning 
that closely tracked its decision in Ring, the Court held that in Florida’s 
capital sentencing scheme, the jury was not required “to make the critical 
findings necessary to impose the death penalty.”109 Further, the Court held 
that the Florida capital sentencing scheme’s incorporation of an advisory 
jury verdict—a feature that Arizona lacked—was insufficient to satisfy the 
Sixth Amendment’s requirements.110 
In addition, the Court rejected Florida’s argument for upholding the 
capital sentencing scheme on the basis of stare decisis.111 The Court 
expressly overruled Hildwin, which had previously held Florida’s capital 
sentencing scheme constitutional.112 
The majority opinion did not reach the question of the Eighth 
Amendment.113 Only Justice Breyer, as in Ring, would have held that the 
Florida sentencing scheme violated the Eighth Amendment.114  
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated above, the Supreme Court should reverse the 
holding of the Florida Supreme Court and find that Florida’s capital 
sentencing framework violates both the Sixth Amendment in light of the 
Court’s ruling in Ring and the Eighth Amendment. Currently, capital 
defendants in Florida are being deprived of their Sixth Amendment right to 
have a jury determine any fact upon which the death penalty may be 
imposed. No longer should Florida be allowed to circumvent this right by 
assigning the jury a merely advisory role. As Justice Scalia so pertinently 
	  
 108.  See Hurst v. Florida, 136 S. Ct. 616, 624 (2016) (“The Sixth Amendment . . . required Florida 
to base Timothy Hurst’s death sentence on a jury’s verdict, not a judge’s factfinding.”). 
 109.  Id. at 622. 
 110.  Id. 
 111.  Id. at 623. 
 112.  See id. (“Time and subsequent cases have washed away the logic of . . . Hildwin.”). 
 113.  Id. at 616. 
 114.  Id. at 624 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
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said, the Court should no longer accept “the repeated spectacle of a man’s 




 115.  Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 612 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
